In 1967, the Interstate 35W Mississippi River Bridge in Minneapolis opened to traffic. The bridge was 1,907 feet long, had 14 spans, and by 2007 carried a daily average of 140,000 total vehicles north and south over four lanes between University Avenue and Washington Avenue. The vehicle count made it one of the busiest bridges in the country over the Mississippi River, and one of three principal arteries into downtown Minneapolis, a city with one of the highest population densities in the Midwest.

Just after 6 p.m. on the evening of August 1, 2007, the 40-year old bridge collapsed into the river and its banks without warning, killing 13 and injuring 121 others. At the time, there were approximately 120 vehicles, carrying 160 people, on the bridge. The impact of the fall broke the span into multiple planes of broken steel and crushed concrete—cars, buses, and trucks all resting precariously along guardrails or suddenly unprotected edges, crashed into other vehicles, partially embedded in the muddy river bank, or dropped precipitously into the river.

The most urgent task was rescuing people from the water and from their vehicles, conducting triage on the injured, and providing transport to area hospitals. Several vehicles were on fire, making firefighting operations a parallel priority. Local and State staff and officials from fire, law enforcement, emergency management, and public works received immediate alerts and, having trained together in classroom settings and through field exercises, knew what to do and with whom they needed to coordinate their response. Years of investing time and money into identifying gaps in the city’s disaster preparedness capabilities; acquiring radios for an interagency, linked 800 MHz system; and participating in training on the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and on the organizational basis for that system (the Incident Command System (ICS) and Unified Command) paid off substantially during response and recovery operations.

The bridge collapse tested the area’s ability to handle a complicated mix of tactical and strategic problems effectively. People and vehicles fell into the water, onto the river banks, and onto the multiple surfaces of the broken bridge. It was a dangerous multilevel accident site, located in the river gorge, that had the ever-present potential for secondary collapse. The fires on the deck; the presence of certain hazardous materials and the prospect of others; steep banks; and collapse debris complicated access, among other difficulties. The bridge was owned by the Federal government, and was operated and maintained by the State of Minnesota. After the collapse, the bridge was lodged in the river where, under Minnesota statute, the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office Water Patrol has jurisdiction; and along the river banks, which are under the jurisdiction of the City of Minneapolis.